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EDITORIAL
Countering misinformation: Strategies, challenges, and 
uncertainties
Fehlinformationen entgegenwirken: Strategien, 
Herausforderungen und Unsicherheiten
Christina Peter & Thomas Koch
1. Introduction
Misinformation has always been an inevitable part of human communication, but 
for several reasons it seems to have become increasingly problematic for demo-
cratic societies in recent years: First, the Internet and social media, in particular, 
make it easy to spread misinformation of any kind, be it deliberately or acciden-
tally. Second, especially with the rise of right-wing populism in many places, po-
litical actors have never been so eager to call the news “fake,” which results in 
uncertainty among the public as to which sources and information can still be 
trusted. Third, and related to this, the increasing polarization of positions in soci-
ety seems to make it almost impossible to share a “common truth.” In conse-
quence, misinformation is more visible these days, and people seem to be more 
susceptive to it than ever before, which has led scholars and journalists to declare 
this an era of post-truth (e.g., Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017).
For communication scholars, these developments touch on the very basis of 
our discipline. Consequently, researchers all over the world have concerned them-
selves with the magnitude of misinformation and its manifestations such as fake 
news, conspiracy theories, or disinformation. Some have put forward conceptual-
izations of these different forms of misinformation (e.g., Egelhofer & Lecheler, 
2019), and empirically, the research has mostly focused on the spread of misinfor-
mation in the course of specific events such as election campaigns (e.g., Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017).
Less attention has been paid to the question of how misinformation can be ef-
fectively countered. This special issue aims to shed light on the effectiveness of 
countering strategies in the context of misinformation and its various forms, and 
the articles it contains place the focus on how misinformation can be effectively 
combated from different perspectives. Before we introduce the contributions, we 
want to briefly revise what we mean by different forms of misinformation, why 
countering is important, and what the research on countering strategies has 
shown to date.
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2. What is misinformation and why does it need countering?
When dealing with the question of how to counter misinformation, it is essential to 
define what kind of information actually needs countering. This might sound trivi-
al, but it is important for at least two reasons: First, there are many terms and defi-
nitions that encompass the phenomenon of misinformation (including fake news, 
rumors, and conspiracy theories, to name a few), and they are not all necessarily in 
agreement. Second, countering strategies might be dependent on the type of misin-
formation we are looking at, for instance, its format, the communicative context, or 
the veracity of its content. At this point, we will not further engage in the more en-
compassing question of whether there actually is such a thing as true information, 
but we agree with Southwell, Thorson, and Sheble’s (2018) understanding that mis-
information is “a category of claim for which there is at least substantial disagree-
ment (or even consensus rejection) when judged as to truth value among the widest 
feasible range of observers” (p. 3). Consequently, misinformation – and thus infor-
mation that needs countering – is a message that can mislead receivers, at least rela-
tive to what they would have believed after being exposed to more accurate infor-
mation (see also Stahl, 2006). In that sense, most definitions of misinformation 
incorporate both factually false as well as misleading information (e.g., Bakir & 
McStay, 2018; Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019; Lewandowsky et al., 2017). 
Most scholars agree on the definition of disinformation as intentionally shared 
misinformation either for political or economic reasons (e.g., click-baiting). On 
this basis, Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019) define fake news as a specific type of 
disinformation that mimics real journalistic content (see also Horne & Adali, 
2017; Nelson & Taneja, 2018; Zimmermann & Kohring, 2018). Their three 
definitory aspects of fake news (low in facticity, intention to deceive, journalistic 
format) allow them to distinguish this information type from other forms of mis-
information, for example, poor journalism or news satire.
When it comes to research on combating false information, misinformation as 
the most encompassing term for factually false or strongly misleading informa-
tion has come into focus (e.g., Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 
2012; Southwell et al., 2018). From a normative standpoint, the ultimate goal 
behind combating misinformation is to provide true, factual, and reliable infor-
mation that citizens can base their decisions on, and to wipe out false or strongly 
misleading information that leads to incorrect beliefs. In that sense, the questions 
regarding whether misinformation is shared intentionally or not, whether it mim-
ics journalistic content or not, and whether its goal is to deceive or not are of 
secondary importance. However, the specific type of misinformation might be of 
relevance when we look at specific countering strategies. For example, literacy 
programs may aim at people’s ability to see through fake news and its specific 
characteristics. In addition, disinformation might be harder to correct because the 
source that deliberately spreads false information will most likely continue to do 
so even though he/she knows the information is false. 
Finally, the question regarding whether the information is factually false or 
strongly misleading combined with its complexity influences correction success: 
Psychological research on debunking strategies has shown that corrections can be 
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ineffective when the accurate information is more complex than the false infor-
mation, or when it has no “true” counterpart. 
Lastly, and importantly, following Thorson, Sheble, and Southwell (2018), we 
want to stress the importance of distinguishing between false information, on the 
one hand, and false beliefs, on the other hand. As they point out, not all misinfor-
mation causes misperceptions and not all misperceptions are based on misinforma-
tion. Drawing from this distinction, we propose classifying correction attempts 
based on whether they aim at preventing misperceptions arising from contact with 
misinformation (ex ante strategies), or whether they try to reverse misperceptions 
that have already been formed based on misinformation (ex post strategies). 
3. Why do we fall for misinformation? 
When looking at ways to counter misinformation, inevitably, we need to look at 
why and under which circumstances people choose to accept information as true 
or false in the first place. One of the most decisive factors for determining wheth-
er information is judged to be reliable (and, consequently, whether later correc-
tion attempts may be successful or not) are individual characteristics and the mo-
tivations of the receiver. A key moderator in this context that has been identified 
by several studies is how well a message corresponds with one’s own beliefs (e.g., 
Kahne & Bowyer, 2017; Wyer, 1974). People tend to readily accept information 
that fits their world view or that confirms their preexisting attitudes, but are high-
ly skeptical of contrasting information – a notion that has been explained by 
motivated reasoning and a reduction in cognitive dissonance (Jerit & Barabas, 
2012; Hameleers in this special issue; Kahne & Bowyer, 2017; Taber & Lodge, 
2006). In this regard, strong partisanship is particularly challenging when at-
tempting to counter political misinformation.
Apart from these individual characteristics, message characteristics play an im-
portant role for accuracy perceptions. Especially message valence has been shown 
to be connected to perceived credibility, with negative information being judged 
as more credible than positive information is (e.g., Hilbig, 2012; Koch & Peter, 
2017). Importantly, some studies have shown that fake news content is more neg-
ative than real news is and that it often targets negative emotions (Bakir & 
 McStay, 2017; Horne & Adali, 2017; Zollo et al., 2015). 
Moreover, the source of the misinformation can be decisive for its acceptance. 
Drawing from persuasion research, there are several factors that lead to more 
trust in a given source such as similarity, expertise, or attractiveness (Stiff & 
Mongeau, 2003). The perceived trustworthiness of a source, in turn, affects the 
perceived credibility of the message. Thus, when a message stems from a credible 
source, recipients tend to believe the message and the persuasiveness of the mes-
sage increases (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Koch & 
Zerback, 2013). This is even more relevant as a lot of misinformation is dissemi-
nated through social media and might be shared by friends and peers. 
Thus, even though different forms of misinformation are by no means a new phe-
nomenon, modern media environments seem to have made it a more pressing prob-
lem for multiple reasons. First, information sources have multiplied and so has the 
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information load available to the individual. Consequently, the way in which people 
process information has changed and heuristics have become more important to gain 
and make sense of information (Horne & Adali, 2017; Metzger & Flanagin, 2013). 
Moreover, the Internet has challenged mainstream media’s gatekeeping function by 
giving everybody the chance to spread information to a larger audience. Through the 
Internet in general and social media in particular, any information – accurate or not 
– can be disseminated easily, quickly, and cost-effectively (Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017). Personal opinions of individuals, cat videos, and fake news website posts ap-
pear in the Facebook timeline alongside classic news articles, which makes it increas-
ingly difficult for recipients to distinguish between facts and false information 
( Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2018). 
4. Countering misinformation: Potentials and pitfalls
As outlined above, much literature has dealt with the definition, spread, and nor-
mative implications of mis- and disinformation. Considerably less research has 
looked at how to effectively combat such false information. Generally, two strands 
of countering strategies can be distinguished, which we will further call ex post and 
ex ante strategies. Ex post debunking strategies via corrections come into play 
when “the damage is done,” meaning that research in this area has examined how 
misinformation can be effectively corrected after people have accepted it as true. 
Studies in this context have mostly concentrated on scientific or health myths (for 
an overview see Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017), but some au-
thors have also explored counter-strategies to politically motivated misinformation 
(Southwell et al., 2018; Hameleers, in this special issue). Research on the subject 
has shown that correcting misinformation is a difficult task indeed, as some ap-
proaches seem to be not only ineffective but even detrimental (e.g., Nyhan & 
 Reifler, 2010; Peter & Koch, 2016; Thorson, 2016).
Ex ante strategies, in contrast, deal with how people can be educated in such a 
way that they are able to detect misinformation when encountering it and thus can 
be shielded from its detrimental impact in the first place. Research in this area in-
cludes studies that focus on people’s perception of what misinformation is or how 
its multiple forms manifest (e.g., Kleis Nielsen & Graves, 2017), what strategies 
they use to fact-check (see the contribution of Freiling in this special issue), and 
how awareness of misinformation can be raised via prevention strategies such as 
pre-bunking and media literacy (Boudewyns et al., 2018; Cook, Lewandowsky, & 
Ecker, 2017).
4.1 Ex post debunking via corrections
Research has shown that debunking misinformation ex post is a complex process 
that depends on several factors and researchers do not yet entirely understand the 
underlying psychological mechanisms involved (Chan et al., 2017; Ecker, Lewan-
dowsky, & Apai, 2011; Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Radechovsky, Berger, and 
Wolling in this special issue). Many debunking strategies seem to be rather inef-
fective and some can even backfire and strengthen the belief in the original misin-
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formation (Lewandowsky et al., 2017; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002). How-
ever, researchers have tested different techniques and identified various factors 
that moderate these effects. 
The main challenge when it comes to correcting misinformation is its persis-
tence in the memory. Once a piece of false information is acquired and encoded, 
its influence continues, even if it has been corrected. A well-known example of 
the difficulty in correcting erroneous information concerns the measles, mumps, 
and rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism controversy (e.g., Poland & Spier, 2010; 
Ratzan, 2010): In 1998, The Lancet published a case series study that errone-
ously claimed to have found a link between the MMR vaccination and autism. 
Although the study turned out to be fraudulent and improperly conducted, and 
the research carried out after this publication did not find any indications that 
linked autism to the vaccination, many parents continued to believe that MMR 
vaccines could cause autism (Poland & Spier, 2010). This erroneous belief per-
sisted even though many disclaimer campaigns were launched that tried to de-
bunk the false claim. The consequences of this failed debunking turned out to be 
rather severe: The controversy led to a decrease in MMR vaccine uptake and, in 
turn, to an increase in mumps and measles infections, leading to preventable 
diseases and deaths (Hargreaves, Lewis, & Speers, 2003; Nyhan, Reifler, Richey, 
& Freed, 2014; Poland & Spier, 2010). Studies also revealed negative spillovers 
onto other vaccines (Chang, 2018). The case impressively shows the fatal conse-
quences when misinformation spreads and also illustrates the “societal cost of 
misinformation”: the money spent on follow-up studies and information cam-
paigns to debunk information that is factually incorrect (Lewandowsky et al., 
2012, p. 107). 
Although more than 20 years have passed since the paper erroneously linking 
the MMR vaccination to autism was published, the effects of this piece of misin-
formation still affect vaccine discussions today (Chang, 2018). In particular, re-
search shows that information initially presumed to be correct that later turns out 
to be incorrect continues to influence recipients’ reasoning and later judgments, 
even after the misinformation has been corrected (Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 
2010; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Seifert, 2002). This phenomenon is known as the 
continued influence effect and it is one of the main reasons why corrections fail to 
work: Even if misleading or false information is corrected, people have been 
shown to still use this misinformation during later reasoning (Johnson & Seifert, 
1994). This effect is also observed when people understand and remember the 
retraction. 
Research has come up with different explanations for the continued influence 
effect (Connor Desai, 2018). First, it might be based on false memory recall and 
recognition: People remember the original (wrong) information and not its cor-
rection and, therefore, continue to believe the misinformation. Second, people are 
motivated to ignore a correction (and continue to believe the misinformation) 
when the correction is inconsistent with their own beliefs and personal ideology 
or when the source of the correction is perceived as not trustworthy. Third, the 
corrective message might be perceived as inconclusive and not convincing (Con-
nor Desai, 2018). 
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While the continued influence effect explains why debunking misinformation is 
often ineffective, efforts to correct misinformation can even backfire and reinforce 
recipients’ beliefs in the original false information (Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & 
Schwarz , 2005). These backfire effects can be explained by two different mecha-
nisms. The first is based on familiarity: Attempts to correct misinformation often 
pick up the original false statement, present it to the reader, and debunk it after-
wards (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). This procedure, how-
ever, repeats the misinformation, which increases its processing fluency; that is, it 
is easier for recipients to process this piece of information. This, in turn, leads to 
a feeling of familiarity and recipients tend to misattribute this feeling to the cred-
ibility of the statement (also known as the illusion of truth effect, Bornstein, 
1989; Reber & Schwarz, 1999). In short, the repeated presentation of misinfor-
mation enhances its credibility – even when it has been clearly debunked. A sec-
ond cognitive process that can cause backfire effects is triggered when rectifica-
tions are made by using the false claim with a negation (e.g., “MMR vaccines do 
not cause autism”). Here, people sometimes just remember some specific core ele-
ments of this sentence (e.g., “MMR vaccines” and “autism”) that are later put 
together incorrectly (via the omission of the negation) in the memory (Nyhan & 
Reifler, 2012). Thus, recipients sometimes just remember the false statement and 
forget about the rectification (Peter & Koch, 2016).
Although the above summary points a rather pessimistic picture of ex post de-
bunking strategies, there are also some techniques that have proven to be quite 
successful. Cook and Lewandowsky (2011, p. 1) point out that effective debunk-
ing requires at least three major elements: 
“First, the refutation must focus on core facts rather than the myth to avoid the 
misinformation becoming more familiar. Second, any mention of a myth should be 
preceded by explicit warnings to notify the reader that the upcoming information is 
false. Finally, the refutation should include an alternative explanation that accounts 
for important qualities in the original misinformation.”
4.2 Ex ante prevention strategies
As the previous section has shown, it is fairly hard to correct misinformation 
once an individual has accepted it as true. Consequently, another branch of re-
search has looked at intervention strategies that are targeted at how people can 
be prevented from forming their judgments based on false claims in the first place. 
In addition, detecting misinformation when encountering it can prevent individu-
als from spreading false information further. Most of the research in the area is 
concerned with raising people’s awareness of a) the fact that they may encounter 
potential false or misleading information, especially online, and b) specific char-
acteristics that that type of misinformation may possess and how to detect it. 
Some intervention strategies have also been employed directly by social media 
platforms: Facebook, for instance, tested (and dropped) several strategies and fea-
tures to combat misinformation that mostly targeted the user’s ability to recog-
nize misinformation at the time of the encounter such as employing warning la-
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bels (Mena, 2019) and a related article function that should provide the user with 
further information on a topic (Bode & Varga, 2015). 
To gain insight into what people actually understand to be misinformation and 
the aligned concepts, Kleis Nielsen and Graves (2017) conducted focus groups to 
assess people’s understanding of the term fake news. While most of their partici-
pants agreed that the term had been weaponized to discredit the news media, they 
also connected it to poor or biased journalism. In addition, some expressed how 
they understood fake news as news that they personally held no trust in. Both no-
tions seem to be an expression of people’s growing frustration with and distrust in 
the mainstream media, and of an increasingly flexible or at least subjective under-
standing of truth. These results are important as they may provide insights into 
why journalistic fact-checking and corrections through mainstream media sources 
may be ineffective, at least for some sections of society: “Decreased trust could 
then create a vicious cycle in which people resist corrections issued from those 
same institutions” (Thorson et al., 2018, p. 290). Therefore, one way of counter-
ing misinformation on a macro level is certainly to strengthen trust in institutions 
whose role is to provide reliable information in the first place (e.g., science and 
journalism). 
Furthermore, the results underline the importance of carefully defining and dif-
ferentiating between different types of misinformation and analyzing their specif-
ics in order to build literacy programs based on these characteristics. Horne and 
Adali (2017) compared the language and style of different information types and 
found that fake news clearly differed from real news in several ways. Most im-
portantly, fake news presents its main claim in the title, allowing the reader to 
grasp its content without reading the actual article, which resonates well with 
heuristic information processing in social networks. In contrast, it seems that ac-
tual news does the opposite and adopts click-baiting behavior to raise the read-
ers’ interest in the news article (Kuiken, Schuth, Spitters, & Marx, 2017). 
Continuous research on what misinformation and its various forms look like 
and on who spreads it is especially important as groundwork for building inter-
vention strategies that will help individuals to identify misinformation. One ave-
nue of research has looked at the effects of what has been labeled “inoculation” 
or “pre-bunking” (Cook et al., 2017; Compton & Pfau, 2005). Inoculation theory 
is rooted in persuasion research and posits that individuals can be made resistant 
against specific messages by warning them about potential persuasive attacks and 
providing them with information on what these attacks will look like (e.g., what 
arguments will be used, what sources will be cited; McGuire & Papageorgis, 
1961). A meta-analysis has found inoculation messages to be more effective than 
messages that only convey accurate information (Banas & Rain, 2010). In addi-
tion, Cook and colleagues (2017) found inoculation about misinformation re-
garding global warming to be effective in neutralizing its effects. 
In a more encompassing way, media literacy programs are targeted at educat-
ing citizens about media and communication practices, media use and content, 
and media effects (Potter, 2018). Several initiatives such as the news literacy pro-
ject (newslit.org) work with journalists as well as platforms to develop and con-
stantly update such programs. Indeed, Kahne and Bowyer (2017) were able to 
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show that while political knowledge among adolescents actually increased moti-
vated reasoning and thus the acceptance of misinformation that aligned with 
their prior political beliefs, media literacy led to more resistance to misinforma-
tion and more acceptance of evidence-based information. 
Certainly, one important avenue in combating misinformation is to stop it 
from being disseminated in the first place – a strategy that goes beyond the scope 
of our special issue. In this context, Twitter has lately gained public attention by 
banning political advertising altogether, with its founder Jack Dorsey reasoning 
that its mission to combat misinformation would be ludicrous if political actors 
could simply buy their way in to target specific users with whatever message they 
choose (jack, 2019 October 30). 
5. The present special issue
Even though misinformation may not be a new phenomenon, it has certainly 
gained traction both in society as well as among scientists: Changes in media en-
vironments and the way we encounter, consume, and interpret information have 
made it a more prevalent problem because it is easier to spread misinformation in 
its various forms, but also because it is more dangerous to fall for it. As elabo-
rated above, there might not only be one solution for effectively countering mis-
information and countering strategies need to be tailored to the specific content 
that needs correction. Most importantly, both ex ante and ex post strategies need 
to be combined in order to maximize the impact of countering. The contributions 
to this special issue shed light on this topic from both perspectives. 
The first paper by Jan P. Kluck, Leonie Rösner, and Nicole C. Krämer focuses 
on ex-post debunking strategies. The authors examine the effects of numerical 
user representations and user comments on the credibility of false news posts on 
social media. They report the results of an online experiment using a 3 × 3 be-
tween-subjects design. They tested how a numerical credibility rating (implement-
ed as a star rating that depicts the average value of other users’ evaluations) and 
user comments on the credibility of the article affected the participants’ perceived 
credibility of a news story on social media as well as their willingness to share it 
publicly or privately. Both factors were either presented with a positive or nega-
tive valence (or were absent in the control condition). The experiment shows that 
user comments doubting the credibility of an article affect its perceived credibility 
and thus indirectly reduce the willingness to share it. However, comments that 
confirmed the credibility of the news post did not affect these perceptions. Thus, 
the study indicates that user comments that express concerns regarding an arti-
cle’s credibility affect the recipients’ reasoning more than positive comments do. 
Moreover, the study revealed that the numerical credibility rating did not affect 
the perceived credibility of the news post and the willingness to share it. Thus, the 
paper underlines what we discussed above: Countering misinformation is a com-
plex process that depends on several factors – and we do not know and under-
stand these factors entirely. 
In the context of ex ante countering, Isabelle Freiling investigates users’ strate-
gies to detect misinformation in online social networks. Through 15 qualitative 
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interviews, she provides valuable insights into how users evaluate the information 
they encounter in social networks and under which circumstances they might be 
prone to misinformation. Participants were asked to think aloud while evaluating 
the accuracy of information provided by Facebook posts, and they were addition-
ally asked to reflect on their behavior retrospectively. First, the participants 
scrolled through their personal timelines to ensure that relevant cues were present 
such as their relationship with the person who had shared the post. After this, 
they were provided with five additional posts, three of which contained false in-
formation. Even though the setting represents scenarios where users actively ques-
tion the validity of information, the results help us to understand which strategies 
they apply to reach a conclusion and which cues are important. Overall, Freiling 
identifies three major strategies: (1) searching for more, which was applied when 
the topic was interesting or important; (2) knowledge carries weight, meaning 
that a message is deemed true when it fits prior knowledge or the source is well 
known; and (3) every detail needs to fit, which describes a thorough considera-
tion of every aspect of the post. 
Johanna Radechovsky, Priscila Berger, and Jens Wolling contribute to the spe-
cial issue with a paper on the effectiveness of  journalists’ attempts to correct re-
cipients’ misperceptions of different issues. Using an online survey, the authors 
examined the effectiveness of six different clarifications. Thus, in addition to the 
experimental approach of the first study and the qualitative interviews in the sec-
ond paper, this contribution offers a third methodological perspective to examine 
the countering of misinformation.  The participants read short statements on a 
specific topic (two of them were correct, while the other four were at least par-
tially false). The participants were then asked to assess the accuracy of the six 
statements. Afterwards, the authors presented each participant with a rectification 
of one of the incorrect statements that was initially assessed as being true by the 
participant (or that the participant was indecisive about). The study shows that 
participants adjusted their assessment of the accuracy of the statements (in five 
out of six cases) in line with the rectification. In doing so, this paper also focuses 
on ex post strategies and highlights the potential of rectifications to correct misin-
formation.
In his contribution, Michael Hameleers tests the effectiveness of fact-checks for 
refuting different kinds of online misinformation ex post. He collected data from 
both the US and the Netherlands and took partisanship into account. Important-
ly, he looks at different forms of misinformation and compares messages that use 
fraudulent empirical evidence with those that rely on personal testimony. This is 
novel insofar as most prior studies have tested different types of corrections but 
have not systematically varied the content of the presented misinformation. Ham-
eleers finds that both types of misinformation were judged as equally credible 
prior to debunking, which he ties to recent trends in post-factual relativism, 
meaning that evidence-based information might no longer be judged as more 
credible than anecdotal evidence is. On a more positive note, he finds fact-check-
ing to be effective in countering both types of misinformation, adding to evidence 
that ex post strategies are not as ineffective as the early research might have sug-
gested. His findings further suggest including national contexts in research on 
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countering, as he found fact-checking to be more effective in the Netherlands 
than in the USA. 
Finally, a research report by Philipp Müller and Anne Schulz completes this 
special issue. Using a quota sample of German Internet users, they shed light on 
people’s perceptions of Fakebook’s role in the context of fake news and the 
aligned debate. The results indicate that the evaluation of Facebook as a reliable 
news source is not linked to the overall amount of fake news that users report 
having encountered, but to where they think this stems from: Individuals who 
see traditional news media as the main source of fake news evaluate Facebook 
more positively, whereas users who relate them to alternative sources are more 
skeptical of Facebook as a news source and report engaging in verification be-
haviors more frequently. Müller and Schulz discuss their findings against the 
backdrop of audience polarization, which suggests that people who distrust in-
formation provided by traditional news outlets are more drawn to alternative 
sources and are less skeptical of information provided through intermediaries 
such as Facebook.
Taken together, the contributions of this special issue expand the research on 
countering misinformation, both in the areas of ex ante and ex post strategies. 
Particularly, they highlight the importance of tackling the topic from different 
perspectives and with different methodological approaches. 
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